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Justice for Large Earlobes!  A Comment 
on Richard Arneson’s “What Is             
Wrongful Discrimination?” 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN* 
Suppose that we have nothing to eat but canned tomatoes, and that we 
need to open the cans somehow.  You suggest that a good way to open 
the cans would be to hit them with a sledgehammer.  One way of 
responding would be to show you a can opener, explain how it works, 
and compare the likely results of using the can opener versus the 
sledgehammer.  Of course, there is another strategy: let you use the 
sledgehammer and see what happens.  After you take a whack at the 
problem, you probably will be ready to consider other methods. 
Richard Arneson’s paper, “What Is Wrongful Discrimination?,” is 
(perhaps unintentionally) an example of this second strategy.  At 
different points in his paper, Professor Arneson offers two inconsistent 
descriptions of what his paper tries to accomplish.  The first is to answer 
his title question.1  The second is to answer that question within “a 
deontological morality that holds, contrary to act consequentialism, that 
what is morally right and wrong . . . is fixed by . . . . moral constraints 
[which] mainly take the form of moral rights of others that are 
correlative with moral obligations that one must not violate these 
rights.”2  In a footnote, Professor Arneson explains that this assumed 
 *  Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University School of 
Law.  Thanks to Richard Arneson and Kim Yuracko for helpful comments on an earlier 
draft. 
 1. Richard Arneson, What Is Wrongful Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
775 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 778-79. 




moral framework “is not the one I would ultimately endorse.  The 
project of this essay is to explore what one should hold about 
discrimination, given that one adheres to a deontological morality.”3  In 
other words, he is going to try to do the job with a tool that he thinks is 
flawed. He is not going to show us how to open the can.  He is going to 
show us how to open the can with a sledgehammer.  It is therefore 
unsurprising⎯and not necessarily a criticism of Professor Arneson⎯that 
the exercise is messy and results in less nourishment than we might have 
hoped for. 
Within the deontological framework, Professor Arneson suggests, one 
should hold that “[d]iscrimination that is intrinsically morally wrong 
occurs when an agent treats a person identified as being of a certain type 
differently than she otherwise would have done because of unwarranted 
animus or prejudice against persons of that type.”4  “Animus is hostility 
or, more broadly, a negative attitude, an aversion.”5  Prejudice is “faulty 
belief,” which means not simply “responding to individuals on the basis 
of statistical indicators their broad characteristics suggest,” but specifically 
“beliefs . . . formed in some culpably defective way,” as for example if 
“I simply am . . . lazy in forming beliefs.”6
Professor Arneson defends his view against Judith Thomson’s claim 
that an action’s moral permissibility can be fully assessed on the basis of 
a thin description of that action, unencumbered by whether the agent 
would be at fault if he did it or with what intention the agent would do 
the action if he were to do it.7  Intentions, he argues, might render 
morally wrong an otherwise permissible action.  He then considers some 
possible thin description accounts of wrongful discrimination, for 
example, a right of the most qualified applicant to be selected for a job, 
and shows that they will not adequately capture the wrongfulness that 
we are after. 
After filling out his conception of wrongful discrimination, Arneson 
shows that this conception is not very helpful in determining which 
kinds of discrimination are particularly wrongful.  The definition can 
encompass, for example, discrimination against persons with large 
 3. Id. at 778 n.7. 
 4. Id. at 779. 
 5. Id. at 787. 
 6. Id. at 779, 787-89.  This part of Arneson’s paper is under-theorized.  What 
would it mean to be reprehensibly lazy in forming one’s beliefs?  Accuracy has costs.  
Everyone believes things on the basis of dubious hearsay, if only because it is not worth 
the trouble to investigate further.  Some further account—which probably will turn on 
the kinds of considerations of historical and cultural context that I emphasize at the end 
of this paper—is necessary before we can know what sometimes makes otherwise 
normal laziness reprehensible. 
 7. Id. at 779-84. 
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earlobes if done with animus or prejudice.8  The upshot is that “clarifying 
the idea of wrongful discrimination is not going to do much heavy lifting 
for the task of determining what social justice requires with respect to 
policies for dealing with suspect classifications.”9  He surveys discrimination 
based on age, sex, sexual orientation, and beauty or ugliness to show that 
they “pose radically separate and distinct questions of justice that require 
remedies specifically attuned to each type of classification’s particular 
set of issues.”10  So, Arneson concludes, “the antidiscrimination norm 
does not help in formulating policies which adequately respond to the 
motley of issues we face.”11
I agree with Professor Arneson that the antidiscrimination norm he 
formulates is not much help in deciding concrete discrimination issues.  
However, unless better tools can be shown, the case for the sledgehammer 
has not been refuted.  Everything he says can be admitted, and the 
deontologist can still respond, “Well, Richard, do you want the tomatoes 
or not?” 
The crucial flaw in deontology as Professor Arneson conceives it is 
that it considers the discriminator in isolation: wrongful discrimination is 
identified wholly in terms of the discriminator’s defective intentions.  
Social context disappears from the analysis.  According to Arneson, 
discrimination against people with large earlobes, if based on animus or 
prejudice, is indistinguishable from discrimination against African-
Americans. 
Because Arneson focuses so tightly on the discriminator’s intentions, 
the discrimination itself disappears from his analysis.  His description in 
defining the wrongful conduct is as thin as anything Thomson proposes, 
but unlike Thomson, Arneson focuses on the perpetrator’s mental state 
rather than the discriminator’s external conduct.  It is not clear that he 
needs to look at external conduct at all.  I can unfairly subject a person to 
my unwarranted animus simply by scowling at them, unnoticed, as they 
 8. Id. at 796. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.  This part of the paper is itself encumbered by unfortunate stereotypes, as 
when he asks us to suppose that “in a sexually tolerant society, gay men are not 
significantly involved in the childrearing, on the whole and on the average.”  Id. at 802.  
The 2000 Census found that, of the nearly 600,000 same-sex couples who reported 
themselves as “unmarried partners,” children were present in 34% of lesbian couples and 
22% of gay male couples.  For comparative purposes, consider that Census also found 
46% of married heterosexual couples were raising children.  SEAN CAHILL, SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 43-46 (2004). 
 11. Arneson, supra note 1, at 796. 




pass by my window.  Perhaps such scowling is intrinsically wrong in all 
contexts.  But discrimination thus understood has little to do with the 
kind of discrimination in which most of us are interested.  If all 
discrimination were of that kind, then it is unlikely that anyone would 
have bothered to organize this symposium. 
Professor Arneson is right that thick description is what is needed, but 
the description we need is thicker than the one he describes.  At the end 
of his paper, he describes the larger project as “liberating society from 
the social pathologies inherited from past caste hierarchies (and about 
preventing the rise of new invidious caste hierarchies) . . . .”12  Yet his 
account of wrongful discrimination has no necessary place for history or 
culture.  Any account of discrimination that does not rely on history 
or culture will be a poor tool for the job of identifying wrongful 
discrimination. 
If one examines the prevailing theories of antidiscrimination law, one 
finds that some focus, as Professor Arneson does, on the process by 
which discriminatory decisions get made, some focus on discrimination’s 
stigmatizing message, and some focus on the bad tangible results.  All 
capture a part of the problem. 
Process theory, which focuses on racism’s contaminating effect on the 
way in which decisions get made, is the type of approach that Professor 
Arneson has offered us.  It focuses on the decisionmaking process to see 
whether that process is contaminated by unwarranted animus or 
prejudice.  As we have seen, this approach has difficulty distinguishing 
racism from earlobe discrimination.  Yet at the same time, it depends on 
this very distinction: Professor Arneson’s paper implicitly relies on race 
as the paradigmatic case of discrimination from which he wants to 
generalize.  Process theory thus points beyond itself toward a larger 
problem that lets us understand why some kinds of discrimination are 
especially problematic. 
That larger context is the focus of result-based theories.  But those 
theories, too, are incomplete.  A theory that focuses on stigma fails to 
specify which sorts of stigma are impermissible and why.  A stigma-
focused theory also points beyond itself to a larger social reality in 
which stigma is inscribed and reproduced.  Group-disadvantage theories 
focus directly on social reality.  But if we only look at material disadvantage, 
we lose sight of any specific concern about discrimination.  In order to 
capture this, we must pay attention to process.  The search for the central 
 12. Id. at 807. 
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project of antidiscrimination law thus moves in a circle.  Each theory is 
incomplete and points toward one of the others.13
The theories are thus connected because each of them identifies one 
moment in a process by which inequality is institutionalized.  In the 
decisionmaking process, stigmatic meanings such as racism (which wrongly 
attributes inferior worth to some people) are externalized into the world.  
Once externalized, they become objective in a distribution of prestige (or 
lack thereof), power, and tangible goods.  Through the experience of this 
objective reality, society’s members internalize the meanings anew. 
Each theory focuses on one of the moments through which a stigmatizing 
reality reproduces itself.14  Process theorists focus on the moment of 
externalization, when stigmatizing meanings manifest themselves in 
decisionmaking.  Group-disadvantage theorists focus on the moment of 
objectivation, the concrete reality that these meanings create.  Stigma 
theorists focus on the moment of internalization, when the meanings are 
absorbed by the participants in the culture.  Strictly speaking, none of 
these theories are wrong; indeed, all have part of the beast in their grip.  
Moreover, because each of these moments is necessary to the meaning-
producing process, the disruption of any one of them would help derange 
the process. 
One can better fight the beast if one can see it whole.  Each of the 
three diagnoses of the problem points to an aspiration that cannot be 
realized if only that particular symptom is addressed.  Repairing the 
decisionmaking process is impossible without sealing off the source of 
the contamination.  The contamination’s source turns out to be the racism 
entrenched within the larger culture in which the process is situated.  
Racial stigma cannot be ended without changing the social facts in which 
that stigma is inscribed and which in turn daily reinscribe it.  Material 
inequalities cannot be addressed without changing the process by which 
they are generated and legitimated.  All three theories point toward a 
larger problem, one that is deeply embedded in our culture. 
Each of us, in our daily activities, constitute the culture in which we 
live, and to that extent each of us has the ability, and therefore the 
 13. The claims I make here are defended in detail in ANDREW KOPPELMAN, 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 1-114 (1996). 
 14. Descriptions of the wrongs of discrimination can, of course, be disaggregated 
even further.  See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination 
Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519, 
519-20 (2001). 




obligation, to reshape that culture.  This means that we have an obligation to 
avoid racial discrimination that does not apply to discrimination against 
those with large earlobes.  It is true, as Professor Arneson says, that 
different kinds of discrimination present different issues.  But it is 
possible to say more than that, and to note some unifying themes.  What 
unites discrimination against African-Americans, women, and gay 
people is that they are all, in American culture, subject to discrimination 
based on a belief that they are less worthy and deserving than others, and 
that by virtue of their status, their welfare matters less than that of 
others.15
Finally, both Professor Arneson and I have been very hard on 
deontology here, so let me end with a few words on deontology’s behalf.  
There is nothing in the structure of deontology that demands that it be 
indifferent to the issues of social context raised in this essay.  The 
premier minimal-state deontologist is Robert Nozick, for whom we have 
no obligations other than the avoidance of force and fraud.16  But even 
Nozick cannot be indifferent to whether prejudice infects the culture.  
Nozick is as devoted to state impartiality as any process theorist, and so 
cannot tolerate racism, even unconscious racism, in government 
decisionmaking.17  In a culture in which racism, conscious or unconscious, 
is pervasive, government decisionmakers who have internalized that 
racism will be incapable of neutrality, even with respect to the minimal 
range of government functions that Nozick deems legitimate.  Killers of 
blacks will receive less harsh treatment than killers of whites.  Thugs who 
attack gay people may not be sanctioned at all.  Rape and sexual harassment 
of women will not be taken seriously by the state.  Transformation of the 
culture is necessary if impartial government decisionmaking is to become 
a reality.  If, as Nozick thinks, people in the state of nature have good 
reason to establish an impartial state, then they have equally good reason 
to purge their culture of pervasive prejudice.18  And this can generate an 
 15. Here this is only a summary assertion.  For extensive supporting arguments, 
see KOPPELMAN, supra note 13, at 115-76; Andrew Koppelman, Are the Boy Scouts 
Being As Bad As Racists?: Judging the Scouts’ Antigay Policy, 18 PUB. AFF. Q. 363, 
364-73 (2004). 
 16. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (arguing 
that the nonviolation of individual rights serves as a moral constraint on action rather 
than as an end state to be achieved).  However, Nozick’s libertarianism is an unattractive 
position.  See THOMAS POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 15-62 (1989) (arguing that Nozick’s 
institutional scheme “is not sensitive to what sort of social world his ground rules would 
tend to engender given full compliance . . . .”).  Moreover, in his later work Nozick 
abandons his libertarian position.  See ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286-96 
(1989). 
 17. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 13, at 182.  
 18. See id. at 172, 183-84. 
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obligation not to discriminate.19  Where this obligation obtains will depend 
on history and culture: there will be reason to worry about racism that is 
not present with the occasional idiosyncratic prejudice against those with 


































 19. See id. at 181-90. 
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